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Abstract 
Using panel data of 17 European Union countries, we find robust empirical support 
for a positive impact of venture capital on innovation. After controlling for the 
potential endogenous relationship between venture capital and innovation, the results 
indicate that venture capital fosters innovation but mainly on a later stage. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of venture capital (VC) in promoting innovation has received growing attention 
recently by both academics and policy makers. It has been argued that VC is particularly well 
suited to support the creation of innovative startup firms. Frequently these new firms own 
innovative technologies but they lack financial resources as well as expertise in terms of 
knowledge of markets and entrepreneurial. For this reason governments of European 
countries have been concerned in fostering VC as a means to achieve job creation, innovation 
and economic growth (Bottazi and Da Rin, 2002). 
However, the real effects of VC on innovation have been difficult to establish (Hall and 
Lerner, 2010; Dessi and Yin, 2012). This is largely due to the causality relationship between 
VC and innovation. On one hand, VC is aimed at supporting innovation. On the other hand, 
there could be more innovation not because VC caused it, but rather because venture 
capitalists reacted to the signaling made by firms. In this case, the more innovative firms 
select venture capitalists for financing rather than VC causing firms to be more innovative. 
Hence in order to assess the true impact of VC on innovation this issue needs to be taken into 
account. 
So far, few studies have dealt with the potential endogenous relationship (Popov and 
Rossenboom, 2012; Bertoni et al., 2011; Samila and Sorenson, 2011). However, most of these 
studies do not consider the dynamic nature of the data that typically characterizes innovation 
and, specifically, patents counts. As such, failing to do so will produce biased. Bertoni et al. 
(2011) and Samila and Sorenson (2011) studies are the exception yet they do not investigate 
the impact of VC on innovation per se but rather on the number of firm start-ups or firm 
performance. 
This paper fills this gap by estimating a dynamic panel data model for 17 European countries 
observed during 2000-2009 that allows us to control for the potential endogenous relationship 
between VC and innovation as well as to take into account the dynamic characteristic of our 
dependent variable. Our paper is close to Geronikolau and Papachistou (2012) and Popov and 
Roosenboom (2012) in that we also use European country-level data. 
2. Data and methodology 
We use annual VC data obtained from EUROSTAT statistics database. The observed 
countries are Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United 
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Kingdom. Patent data refer to the European Patent Office (EPO) and was collected from the 
EUROSTAT database. 
Following previous contributions (Hirukawa and Ueda, 2011; Geronikolau and Papachristou, 
2012) we choose patent applications rather than patent grants. The former are considered a 
good proxy to innovative ideas, whereas patent grant is a better proxy to innovative output 
(Hall and Lerner, 2010). In this sense, the signalling effect of a patent is more pronounced on 
the time of application rather than on the time of patent grant, which seems more adequate to 
study the relationship between VC and innovation. Another reason justifying the use of patent 
applications is because there might be a significant time lag between filing and application 
and receiving a grant. From the EUROSTAT we also obtained for each country data on 
business and government research and development (R&D) expenditures, the ratio of science 
and technology labour to total labour force, total aggregate investment and gross domestic 
product (GDP). From the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) we collected an index of 
protection of intellectual property that ranges from 1 (low) to 10 (high) protection level.  
Our main goal is to test for the impact of VC investments on innovation. Thus, country i´s 
patents application function can be described as: 
Patentsit = 1Patentsit-1 + 2VCit + 3Xit + it   (1) 
 
where Patentsit is country i´s patent applications ratio to country i gross domestic product 
(GDP) in year t, Patentsit-1  is its lagged value, VCit is country i´s investments in venture 
capital, measured by the ratio of total investments in venture capital to aggregate investment, 
Xit is a vector of control variables that are expected to influence country i´s patent 
applications and not VC, and it  is an error term. 
The inclusion in all models of the lagged dependent variable as one of the covariates and the 
potential endogenous nature of the relationship between VC investments and patents require 
the use of appropriate estimation techniques. If causality between VC investments and patents 
runs in both directions then VCit is endogenous in model (1) and correlated with the 
contemporaneous error term.  An additional concern is the dynamic nature of (1), which gives 
rise to autocorrelation and Patentsit-1 will be correlated with the country-specific unobserved 
individual effect.  
To address these issues we follow the contributions by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) on dynamic panel-data models. The 
autocorrelation problem can be eliminated by taking first-differences of equation (1) to 
eliminate country-specific unobserved individual effects and use as instruments for Patentsit-
1, lagged levels of the dependent variable from two or more periods before, which are not 
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correlated with the residuals in differences, assuming no serial correlation in it. The VC 
variable, being endogenous, can be instrumented in a similar way. The validity of the 
instruments used in the estimations can be checked using the Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions. As additional exogenous instruments we include a measure of bank concentration, 
which is the ratio of total assets of the three largest comercial banks to total assets of all 
comercial banks, the corporate tax rate and an index of trust by citizians in European 
institutions. These data were collected from the  EUROBAROMETER. Descriptive statistics 
for the relevant variables are presented in Table 1.  
Insert Table 1 here 
3. Empirical Results 
Table 2 presents estimates for the patents applications function by the System Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM-SYS). For comparison purposes we also present estimates of 
equation (1) by pooled OLS.  Although OLS estimates, column (1), produce biased estimates, 
they show a strong degree of persistence in patents applications as expected, and a non-
significant coefficient on VC investments. For the GMM-SYS we use the one-step estimation 
with finite-sample correction for standard errors suggested by Windmeijer (2005). We 
instrument for the differenced equations, first-differences of the dependent variable using its 
levels lagged at least three periods, and its lagged first-differences as instruments for the level 
equations. VC investments are treated as endogenous and instrumented similarly to lagged 
patents. In order to limit the number of instruments we also apply a single moment condition 
for each period and regressor in columns (2) through (4). 
Insert Table 2 here 
Focusing on our key variable we can see from column (2) that VC investments are 
statistically significant. The tests for serial correlation in the error term reveal a significant 
AR1 and insignificant AR2. This result constitutes a first validation of the instruments used, 
which is then confirmed by the significant Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. As 
expected the estimated coefficient of the lagged variable is smaller in GMM-SYS than in 
OLS. Columns (3) and (4) show the impact of early-stage VC and late-stage VC respectively. 
Interestingly, the estimates show that only late-stage VC has a significant impact on 
innovation. This result suggests that venture capitalists are more willing to support innovation 
only after the initial and more uncertain stage of technology development has been overcome. 
 
4. Conclusion 
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This research extends our understanding of the impact of VC investments on innovation at the 
country level. By explicitly addressing the potential endogenous relationship between VC and 
innovation and controlling for persistence in the patents series our results show that patents 
applications are in fact influenced by VC venturing. However, as one discriminates the effect 
of VC by its type or stage, results show that only the later-stage VC capital is promoting 
innovation. Hence, this result is consistent with the view that the VC role is more to help the 
commercialization of innovation rather than to foster its creation. These results provide policy 
makers a clear picture of the true impact of VC on innovation and what and not expect from 
venture capitalists regarding their role in supporting innovation. 
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Table 1: Empirical variables acronym, description, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. 
Panel A       
Variable Description Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Patents Ratio of patents applications at the EPO to GDP 170 0.010 0.015 0.000 0.062 
VC Ratio of total venture capital investments to total investment 186 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.036 
VC_early stage Ratio of early stage venture capital investments to total 
investment 
186 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.013 
VC_late stage Ratio of late stage venture capital investments to total 
investment 
186 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.023 
 
Panel B     
 Patents VC VC_early stage VC_late stage 
Patents 1.000    
VC 0.188 1.000   
VC_early stage 0.131 0.819 1.000  
VC_late stage 0.192 0.971 0.658 1.000 
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Table 2:  Estimates of the impact of venture capital on innovation 
Dependent variable: Patents  
Estimator OLS 
GMM-
SYS 
GMM-
SYS 
GMM-
SYS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Patentsit-1  
0.929 *** 
(0.023) 
0.795*** 
(0.093) 
0.897*** 
(0.113) 
0.828*** 
(0.097) 
VCit 
0.022 
(0.013) 
0.115*** 
(0.044) 
_ _ 
VC_early stageit _ _ 
0.004 
(0.030) 
_ 
VC_later stageit _ _ _ 
0.127** 
(0.054) 
Observations 135 115 115 115 
Countries 17 16 16 16 
R-squared 0.993 _ _ _ 
AR(1)  _ -4.41 -4.07 -4.36 
(p-value) _ (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)  _ 0.85 0.42 0.76 
(p-value) _ (0.395) (0.676) (0.488) 
Sargan Test  _ 18.58 12.18 16.44 
(p-value) _ (0.017) (0.143) (0.036) 
DF _ 8 8 8 
Notes: GMM stands for GMM system estimation; GMM estimates based on a reduced set of 
instruments with moment conditions in the interval t-3 and t-5 for equations in diferences and between 
t-2 for the equations in levels. All GMM estimates are based on the hypothesis of VC being 
endogenous and with finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005). Standard errors in 
parenthesis. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***1%, **5% and *10%. All 
regressions include control variables and additional instruments as described in section 2. 
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